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Abstract—We develop an approach of key distribution protocol
(KDP) proposed recently by T. Aono et al. A more general mathe-
matical model based on the use of Variable-Directional Antenna
(VDA) under the condition of multipath wave propagation is
proposed. Statistical characteristics of VDA were investigated
by simulation, that allows us to specify model parameters. The
security of the considered KDP is estimated in terms of Shannon’s
information leaking to an eavesdropper depending on the mutual
locations of the legal users and the eavesdropper.
Antenna diversity is proposed as a mean to enhance the KDP
security. In order to provide a better agreement of the shared
keys it is investigated the use of error-correcting codes.
I. INTRODUCTION
The problem of key distribution is still in focus of research
activity especially for wireless LAN systems. This is due to
the severe restriction of asymmetric (public key) cryptography
WLAN implementation entailing a lower processing speed.
In order to solve this problem, quantum cryptography [1]
which allows eavesdropping detection within the key sharing
procedure seems useful. However, this approach does not reach
a practical level due to many technical problems, such as
the requirement of special quantum devices. There are well
known key distribution protocols (KDP) based on the presence
of noise in both legal and illegal channels [2], [3], [4]. But
even though the eavesdropper’s channel is less noisy than the
legal ones and the eavesdroppers is passive, it is necessary to
have the knowledge of the eavesdropper’s noisy power in order
to guarantee a fixed level of key security. Unfortunately this
condition cannot be taken for granted because an eavesdropper
may be able to get some advantage at the cost of better receiver
sensitivity, or a shorter distance of interception that it was
considered by legal parties in the design of the secure KDP.
The most basic assumption on the executed KDP is that the
legal and illegal users have different locations, and this fact has
to be verified by physical means. (For that matter, an existing
special zone surrounding each legal user shall be assumed
where the presence of an eavesdropper is not allowed.)
If it is wanted to share a secret key by wireless communica-
tion among legal users, it is necessary that one user generates
some randomness and then to transmit it to its correspondent in
such a way that it is effectively delivered to the legal recipient
and any eavesdropper perceives either uncorrelated or weak
correlated randomness.
It is possible to provide non-unit correlation under the
condition of multipatch wave propagation. Let us consider
the following mathematical model of the channels between
a source of randomness (the first legal user) and both the
second legal user and the eavesdropper: η =
∑m
i=1 xiξi,
ζ =
∑m
i=1 yiξi, where ξ = (ξi)
m
i=1 is the vector randomness,
x = (xi)
m
i=1 is the coefficient vector of the multipath propaga-
tion to the second legal user, and y = (yi)
m
i=1 is the coefficient
vector of multipath propagation to the eavesdropper. Let us
assume for simplicity E(ξ) = 0, then the following relation
for the correlation coefficient of η and ζ results:
ρ(η, ζ) =
xTRξy√
(xTRξx)(yTRξy)
,
where Rξ is correlation matrix of the random vector ξ.
In a general case ρ(η, ζ) ≤ 1. Moreover if x and y are
orthogonal, (e.g. 〈x, y〉 = 0) and Rξ = Idm , then ρ(η, ζ) = 0.
Common randomness results from fluctuation of the cannel
characteristics due to communicating object motion. Such
approach has been proposed in [5], [6]. But it still entails
another problem: it is easy to break the secret key under an en-
vironment with small fluctuation of the channel characteristics
or in the case when the communicating objects are stopped. In
order to overcome these defects, a more sophisticated method,
using smart antenna excited randomly by electronic means [7],
has been proposed. However, the results presented in this paper
were obtained experimentally and the investigation of KDP
security performed incompletely is extended here.
The goal of the current paper is thus to introduce a
mathematical model and to present a theoretical investigation
concerned with KDP security and reliability based on the
use of a Variable-Directional Antenna (VDA). In order to
justify the statistical characteristics of the VDA, we perform a
simulation of a ring type VDA that is also excited randomly. In
Section II, we describe the conditions of the physical channel
and we introduce an exact mathematical model of the KDP.
The results of the VDA simulation are presented in Section III.
Section IV contains an optimization of the KDP in order to
provide both reliability and security. Finally we conclude the
main results and present some open problems in Section V.
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Fig. 1. Scheme of the communication system corresponding to the KDP.
II. KDP BASED ON MULTIPATCH WAVE PROPAGATION AND
RANDOMLY EXCITED VDA
The scheme of the communication system corresponding to
the KDP is presented in Fig. 1.
The KDP is described in the following steps:
1) The legal user A forms the random antenna diagram by
exciting the VDA with output of truly random generator
(TRG) and fix this diagram for some given time interval
[0, Tj ] of the j-th key bit generation, j = 1, 2, . . . , n.
2) A transmits to B a harmonic signal Sj(t) = cosω0t,
0 ≤ t ≤ Tj/2, with the beam pattern obtained at step 1
over the multipath channel.
3) B receives a harmonic signal from an omni-directional
antenna (ODA) and forms the j-th key bit by comparing
some functional computed with the received signal on
the time [0, Tj/2] with a given threshold.
4) The user B switches off its ODA in a regime of radiation
and transmits the same harmonic signal Sj(t) = cosω0t
within the time interval Tj/2 ≤ t ≤ Tj .
5) The user A switches off its VDA to a receiver and
processes the received signal in the same manner as B
did, forming the j-th key bit.
6) A and B repeat n times the steps 1–5 with new and
independent outputs of TRG in order to create the
desired number of key bits.
Thanks to the Reciprocity Theorem of radio wave propagation
between uplink and downlink, the key sequences of A and B
should be identical up to a random noise of receivers. Then
the signal received by B at time Tj/2 can be expressed as:
yj(t) =
m∑
i=1
υijβij cos(ω0t+ θij), (1)
where, with respect to the i-th ray at the j-th time interval,
βij is the channel attenuation coefficient, υij is the VDA
amplitude gain, θij is the VDA phase shift, including both
phases in antenna diagram and phase shift in i-th ray, and m
is the number of paths (rays).
The signal received by E at time Tj/2 is:
zj(t) =
m∑
i=1
υ′ijβ
′
ij cos(ω0t+ θ
′
ij), (2)
where the primed parameters have the same meaning as the
corresponding parameters in (1) but in possession of E. (We
Fig. 2. The probabilty of the key bit disagreement between legal and illegal
users depending on the correlation coefficient ρ.
neglect initially the noise at the legal receivers, and we assume
at all moment a noise absence at the eavesdropper E, in
advantage with the legal users.)
Later we will show that the probability distributions of the
random values ηj and ζj , which are produced by executing
some functionals from both yj(t) and zj(t) can have a good
approximation by a zero mean Gaussian law. Then we prove
that the probability of a bit disagreement between the j-th bit
of the legal users and the eavesdropper key bits obtained by
comparing them with a zero threshold is:
pe = 2
∫ 0
−∞
dy
∫ +∞
0
exp
(
−x2−2ρxy+y22σ2(1−ρ2)
)
2piσ2
√
1− ρ2 dx
=
1
pi
arc tan
(√
1− ρ2
ρ
)
, (3)
where ρ is the correlation coefficient between ηj and ζj ,
σ2 = Var (ηj) = Var (ζj). The dependence of pe versus ρ
is presented in Fig. 2. We can see that in contrast to our
intuition, the probability pe = 0.1 can be provided even when
the correlation coefficient ρ has a significant value 0.95.
In order to enhance the security of the legal user key string
k shared after completion of the KDP it should be performed
a privacy amplification [3], [8], [9], [10], or more specifically
a mapping of the raw key string k to a shorter key string k˜ of
length ` < n, using the so called hashing procedure k˜ = h(k)
taken from the universal class of hash functions [11]. Then
the amount of Shannon’s information leaking to E given her
knowledge of the string k′ satisfies
I(k˜;k′) ≤ 1
2n−`−t ln(2)
, (4)
where t = n+ n log2
(
p2e + (1− pe)2
)
is the Renyi informa-
tion under the assumption that the errors in the eavesdropper’s
key bits occur independently due to the independently gener-
ated VDA on each of the j-th time intervals. Hence in order
to select the parameter ` we should calculate the correlation
coefficient ρ depending on the mutual location of the legal
user and the eavesdropper, the properties of VDA and the
Fig. 3. Ring antenna with N identical radiators.
characteristics of the multipath cannel. A solution for this
problem will be presented in the next Section.
III. CORRELATION BETWEEN THE VALUES ηj AND ζj
Let us consider as VDA the so called ring antenna (RA)
shown in Fig. 3 having N identical isotropic radiators excited
by their random phases.
Then the complex instant antenna diagram can be presented
by the well known formula [12]:
f(φ, θ) =
N∑
s=1
exp
[
ik0R sin(θ) cos
(
φ− 2pis
N
)
− iψs
]
,
(5)
where ψs is a phase in the s-th radiator; k0 = 2piλ , λ is the
length of the wave; R the radius of the RA; φ is the angle in
the azimuthal plane; and θ is the angle in the vertical plane.
Both instant amplitude and the phase antenna diagrams can
be obtained from (5) and they are random values providing
random exciting to the RA. It would be possible to find
theoretically different statistical characteristics of f(φ, θ) but
it is rather more easy to solve the same problem by simulation.
Since the current paper is limited in space, we present only
the main conclusions based on the simulations for the case of
independent and uniformly distributed phases ψs on (0, 2pi):
• the probability distribution of the amplitude antenna
diagram has a good approximation through the Rice law
which can be approximated in its turn by a Gaussian non-
zero mean law;
• the probability distribution of the phase antenna diagram
has a good approximation by an uniform law on the
interval (0, 2pi).
Next it is possible to compute theoretically the correla-
tion coefficients between ηj and ζj for different functionals
producing them and to find their probability distributions by
simulation. However, it is necessary to specify the channel
model and the functional description. To be more specific,
let us consider a 3-ray channel model and a location of
eavesdropper on the line connecting legal users (Fig. 4).
Fig. 4. Channel model with 3-ray wave propagation.
We select two functionals of yj(t) and zj(t) producing ηj
and ζj and the functionals are compared with some thresholds
in order to obtain the key bit kj . The functionals are (see
eq. (1)):
• envelope: µj =
√
µ2cj + µ
2
sj where µcj =∑m
i=1Aij cos θij , µsj =
∑m
i=1Aij sin θij , Aij = υijβij ,
• phase difference
∆ψj = ψj+1 − ψj = arc tan
µsj+1
µcj+1
− arc tanµsj
µcj
.
In a similar manner, there can be presented the corresponding
functionals for eavesdropper: µ′j , µ
′
cj , µ
′
sj ,∆ψ
′
j .
We will be interested in finding the probability distributions
of all functionals and correlations between similar functionals
of any legal user B and the eavesdropper E. Because it is very
hard to compute these values theoretically, we will find them
by simulation for some given channel parameters.
Let us take `1 = 25m; h1 = 3m, h2 = 3m (distances to
the first and to the second reflecting surfaces, respectively),
N = 6, λ = 12.5cm, R = λ/2 (see Fig’s. 3 and 4). Assume
that E is placed between legal users A and B within the interval
(3–22)m. The results of simulation are presented in Fig. 5. The
dependences of the correlation coefficients rµ,µ′ and r∆ψ,∆ψ′
versus distance ∆` between the eavesdropper E and the legal
user B are shown in Fig. 5(a) and Fig. 5(b).
Since the correlation between the values ∆ψj and ∆ψ′j
occurs less than the correlation between µj and µ′j (see Fig. 5),
it is reasonable to select the phase difference functional in
order to form ηj and compare it with zero threshold for the
kj key bit generation. (In order to coincide phases of support
generators at users A and B, it is possible to transmit a special
pilot signal and to tune phases of both users at the initial stage
of KDP.)
In Fig. 6 there are presented empirical probability distribu-
tions for these functionals. It is evident that both cases can
be approximated by appropriated Gaussian distributions (see
solid curves). Therefore the relation (3) can be used to find
the probability of disagreement between the key bits of the
legal users and the eavesdropper. But before we address to
eq. (4) in order to calculate security of KDP, it should be
(a)
(b)
Fig. 5. The dependence of correlation coefficients versus distances between
legal user and eavesdropper. a) for envelope, b) for phase difference.
(a) envelope (b) phase difference
Fig. 6. Empirical probability distribution for chosen functionals.
taken into account an opportunity for the presence of noise at
the receivers of the legal users.
IV. KDP OPTIMIZATION UNDER NOISY LEGAL CHANNEL
From now on we remove our previous assumption that the
multipath channel among legal users A and B is noiseless but
keep such condition for eavesdropper’s channel. (Obviously,
the last assumption cannot degrade the security of KDP.)
In this setting it is necessary to use some methods in order
to correct disagreements in key bits of legal users. It is very
reasonable to use firstly a selection of the most reliable key
bits with a public discussion over a noiseless channel between
legal users, and then to apply forward error correction codes
(FEC) by sending of the check bits over the same noiseless
channel. (It is worth to note that a noiseless public channel
among legal users can be arranged by the choice of special
regime, namely large signal power or omnidirectional antenna
of the user A that we were unable to use for the execution of
KDP.) The first method of the most reliable key bit selection
is to take decision following the rule:
kj =
 1 if ηj ≥ α,0 if ηj ≤ −α,erase otherwise,
where ηj is the output of ∆ψj , and α a threshold.
After a completion of the KDP including a production of
the erased bits for both legal users it is necessary to mutually
announce the numbers of these bits over public noiseless
channels. In this case, the probability of a key bit disagreement
between legal users and eavesdropper, given by (3), has to
be corrected because an eavesdropper is able to intercept
information about the numbers of accepted key bits over the
public channel. We will take into account this fact later for the
simulation procedure. The second method is to keep only the
most reliable key bits, say M , and to remove the others. This
means that the legal users form variation series of the values
|ηj | on a decreasing order and next to keep (after mutual public
discussion) the first M members of this series to generate
the key bits. Of course in this case the probability of key bit
disagreement pe is changed also against (3).
Let us denote by p1 and p2 the probability of legal key
bit errors after the first and the second method, respectively.
Next we use an error-correcting code (n0 + r, n0) sending a
sequence of r check symbols over public noiseless channel in
order to correct eventually errors in the key sequence. Then
the probability of erroneous decoding Ped by the modified
Gallager’s theorem is [10]: Ped ≤ 2−n0 E(RC), where
E(RC) = max
ρ0∈(0,1)
[
E0(ρ)− ρ0(2RC − 1)
RC
]
,
E0(R) = ρ0 − (1 + ρ0) log2
[
p
1
1+ρ0 + (1− p) 11+ρ0
]
,
RC =
n0
n0+r
, and n0 is the number of bits kj which have been
kept by legal users after erasing the unreliable bits following
the first or the second procedures, and p is the error probability
for the kept bits. In the case of check symbol sending, the
Privacy Amplification Theorem against (4) becomes [10]:
I(k˜;k′) ≤ 1
2n0−`−t−r ln(2)
.
KDP optimization problem is to get the maximum key rate
Rk =
`
n0 + ner
=
`
n
,
while ner is the number of erased symbols after the use of
the method 1 or 2 and given the values I(k˜;k′), Ped, `, and
different signal-to-noise ratio (S/N) at the receivers of the legal
users. We solve this problem by simulation for the case of
Gaussian noise at the legal receivers.
In Tables I and II there are presented the results of such
optimization for typical conditions for the first and the second
method of unreliable bits removal, respectively, where Per is
the probability of key bit erasing.
We can see from these tables that the second method is
for large correlation a little bit better than the first one.
However both methods provide sufficiently reliable and secure
key sharing if eavesdropper is placed on 3–21m away from
legal user B and phase difference is used as key generating
method (see Fig. 5(b)). A similar conclusion is drawn also
for multipath channels with other parameters and locations of
eavesdroppers. In order to enhance the security of the KDP,
antenna diversity can be used when B has m omnidirectional
antennas and he selects randomly one of them at each time
period Tj to receive and transmit signal. Then the relation
finding the Renyi information used in (4) changes for:
t = n+
n
m
log2
(
p˜2e + (1− p˜e)2
)
. (6)
ρ αopt pe Per p1 ` n0 Rk
128 9300 0.014
0.99 0.1 0.027 0.1132 0.0032 256 13100 0.02
512 20600 0.025
128 1200 0.107
0.95 0.1 0.089 0.1132 0.0032 256 1950 0.131
512 3420 0.15
128 350 0.37
0.8 0.15 0.24 0.1438 0.00035 256 580 0.44
512 1055 0.49
TABLE I
KEY RATE MAXIMIZATION FOR THE FIRST METHOD GIVEN
I(k˜;k′) = 10−9 BIT, Ped = 10−5 , S/N=100 AND DIFFERENT ρ.
ρ Mopt pe Per p2 ` n0 Rk
128 7500 0.017
0.99 9000 0.019 0.15 0.0008 256 12100 0.021
512 21300 0.024
128 1130 0.113
0.95 9000 0.084 0.15 0.0008 256 1820 0.141
512 3200 0.16
128 360 0.36
0.8 9000 0.24 0.15 0.0008 256 605 0.42
512 1090 0.47
TABLE II
KEY RATE MAXIMIZATION FOR THE SECOND METHOD GIVEN
I(k˜;k′) = 10−9 BIT, Ped = 10−5 , S/N=100 AND DIFFERENT ρ.
The relation (6) holds with the probability equal to the proba-
bility of the event in which with at least of one of antennas a
mutual location of the legal user and the eavesdropper is got
such that ρ ≤ ρ∗, where ρ∗ is found by (3) given p˜e.
We considered so far a scenario when an eavesdropper uses
the same omnidirectional antenna as the legal user B. But
E can execute directional antenna to separate all rays and
to process the best of them or even apply joint processing
to all of them. We have performed a simulation of the case
with single ray separation and it has been shown that the
correlation coefficient even decreases in comparison with one
presented before. The case of joint processing of separated
rays is noteworthy. But we can remark that even under the very
strong condition in which the eavesdropper knows exactly all
channel parameters both for E and B, there is still uncertainty
about VDA gains in the direction of E and B. Therefore,
generally speaking, the correlation coefficient occurs even in
this case with a value less than one.
V. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
We considered a method of key sharing based on the concept
of a VDA under the condition of multipath channel and we
showed that sufficient security and reliability of the shared
keys can be provided even when the eavesdropper’s channel is
noiseless. The results of investigations show that the security
of the KDP (in terms of Shannon’s information leaking to
eavesdropper) does not depend only on the distance between
legal users and eavesdropper but also on the eavesdropper’s
location. This result somewhat contradicts to a very optimistic
conclusion in [7].
We propose to use the difference-phase functional instead
of either quadrature components or envelope in order to form
key bits. This approach results in less mutual correlation
between legal user and eavesdropper and simplifies a choice
of threshold. The key sequence k is i.i.d if VDA is excited
by independent random phases and threshold is chosen in
an appropriate manner. (This fact has been confirmed by
simulation using statistical tests.) Our contribution consists
also in the proof of relation (3) which allows to connect the
probability of disagreement between the key bits of legal users
and eavesdropper with the correlation of corresponding values.
Unfortunately, a limited space of the paper does not allow us
to show all simulation results for different multipath channels
and mutual location of legal users and eavesdroppers, which
we have got at our disposition.
In the future we are going to investigate: i) the use of
multitone signals in the KDP, ii) the localization of optimal
processing of the eavesdropper rays separation in order to
provide the greatest correlation, iii) the use of real FEC and
effective decoding algorithms with KDP (instead of extended
Gallager’s bounds); and, iiv) the use of other types of VDA
(like ESPAR or others).
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